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Abstract:
In the first part of the paper, two methods of philosophical study of moral 
responsibility are presented: rational and naturalistic. Next, the results of the 
research on the conditions of ascription of moral responsibility based on both 
methods will be discussed. These conditions aim to find a place for moral 
responsibility within the folk image of the world. It will be shown that both 
methods lead to similar results – the condition of ascription of responsibility 
is the capacity to control one’s action. In the last part of the paper, empirical 
research pertaining to responsibility and its relationship with folk intuitions will 
be assessed.
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Streszczenie:
W pierwszej części artykułu przedstawione zostaną dwie metody filozoficz-
nych badań odpowiedzialności: metoda racjonalistyczna i metoda natura-
listyczna. Następnie omówione zostaną wyniki badań dotyczących warun-
ków przypisywania odpowiedzialności uzyskane za pomocą tych dwóch 
metod, z których obie prowadzą do wskazania miejsca odpowiedzialności 
w potocznym obrazie świata. Jak się okaże, obie metody prowadzą do 
zbieżnych rezultatów, gdyż w obu przypadkach warunkiem przypisywania 
odpowiedzialności będzie posiadanie tego samego rodzaju kontroli działa-
nia. W ostatniej części artykułu przedstawione zostaną naukowe badania 
związane z odpowiedzialnością oraz ich związek z dotyczącymi jej potocz-
nymi intuicjami.
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1. Introduction
The naturalization of responsibility, or the 
search for naturalistic conditions for ascrip-
tions of  responsibility is one of the hotly de-
bated issues within philosophy. This state of 
affairs can be explained by pointing to two 
issues related to philosophical method under-
stood in abstracto. First of all, due to the devel-
opment of empirical sciences, the usefulness 
of the traditional philosophical method, that is 
conceptual analysis, is being questioned more 
and more frequently and for justified reasons. 
According to the traditional view, one of the 
basic aims of conceptual analysis is to reveal 
intuitons about meanings related to the con-
cepts studied, which is to enable, among other 
things, a correct understanding of phenomena 
corresponding to these concepts. The start-
ing point of this analysis is therefore the phi-
losopher’s beliefs, which indicate how a given 
concept should be understood. Guided by his 
intuitions, he then breaks down the studied 
concept into more basic parts, thus defining 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
given concept - i.e., the conditions for under-
standing the phenomenon to which it refers. 
Conceptual analysis understood in this way 
is therefore a rational or a priori method, as it 
does not require experimental confirmation of 
the results of these studies. This rationalism 
would not be particularly problematic for phi-
losophers, if not for some of its consequences. 
Many philosophical arguments are based on 
premises or lead to conclusions that seem to 
contradict the facts revealed by experimental 
science, i.e. by cognitive science, the purpose 
of which is to explain the mind. In fact, these 
sciences examine the same phenomena that 
have been the subject of philosophers’ inter-
est for millennia – perception, memory, mean-
ing, will or consciousness. The method whch 
allows to avoid this danger - the naturalistic 
method – consists in basing one’s research 
on data from these very sciences, not on the 
philosopher’s intuition. The acceptance of the 
naturalistic method does not, of course, force 
the rejection of conceptual analysis, because, 
as it turns out, it plays an important role at 
various stages of study. However, identifying 
this analysis with the search for necessary 
and sufficient conditions for understanding a 
given phenomenon - that is, searching for the 
essence of this phenomenon - is not particu-
larly convincing. 
The second issue related to the philosophical 
method, which causes a special interest in the 
issue of responsibility, is based on a certain 
uniqueness of this problem. This uniqueness 
lies in the fact that the problem of responsi-
bility seems to elude the naturalistic method 
of inquiry and is seems to be suited to the 
rational method. The reason for this is that 
responsibility is a phenomenon belonging to 
the folk image of the world. The problem of 
conditions of responsibility ascriptions would 
not occur if, in the folk image of the world, 
there were no contradictory intuitions about 
when someone could be considered respon-
sible for a given act. Due to the fact that the 
starting point of the research on the rational 
method is intuition, this method seems to 
Słowa kluczowe: 
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be particularly well suited to this problem. In 
turn, the scientific investigations, in the case 
of which the naturalistic method seems to be 
appropriate, does not allow us to see why rec-
ognizing someone as responsible for a given 
act may be problematic. However, only with 
the use of the naturalistic method is it possi-
ble to reconstruct psychological mechanisms 
that play a role in the context of responsibility 
ascriptions. Thanks to such a reconstruction, 
it is possible to indicate whether the intui-
tions connected with ascribing responsibility 
are justified. For example, if it turns out that 
these intuitions are created by psychological 
mechanisms that generate systematic cogni-
tive errors, then these intuitions will not be 
justified. In the first part of the article, two 
methods of philosophical research on respon-
sibility will be presented: the rational method 
and the naturalistic method. Next, the results 
of research on the conditions of responsibility 
ascriptions obtained by means of these two 
methods will be presented. Both of them  al-
low to find a  place for responsibility within the 
folk image of the world. As it turns out, both 
methods lead to convergent results, because 
in both cases the condition for ascribing re-
sponsibility will be connected with a similar 
type of control of the action. The last part of 
the article will present scientific research re-
lated to responsibility and its relationship with 
its folk intuitions.
2.  Responsibility from the 
philosophical perspective
The philosophical research on responsibility 
can be divided into two related fields. Firstly, 
these studies concern the psychological mech-
anisms that generate judgments which ascribe 
responsibility. Following Peter Strawson, they 
can be collectively described as reactive atti-
tudes, which include various emotions, such 
as anger, resentment or gratitude[1]. Secondly, 
these studies deal with a collection of folk be-
liefs about responsibility, which include beliefs 
about appropriate conditions of responsibility 
ascription that make up the notion of responsi-
bility and which are at the heart of the intuitions 
about this phenomenon.
Methods of philosophical studies on responsi-
bility can be divided into two types: the rational 
and the naturalistic. Studies based on the ra-
tional method mainly concern the second field 
of research described above, that is folk beliefs 
regarding responsibility. Rationalism in this con-
text consists in the analysis of the concept of 
responsibility, and in particular in the analysis of 
the relationship between this concept and, for 
example, concepts such as determinism or free 
will. These analyzes usually lead to claims about 
1Strawson, P. (1993) Freedom and Resentment, in: Fischer, J., Ravizza, 
M. (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Ithaca, p. 45–66.
Many philosophical arguments are based on premises or 
lead to conclusions that seem to contradict the facts re-
vealed by experimental science, i.e. by cognitive science, 
the purpose of which is to explain the mind.
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the necessary and sufficient conditions for re-
sponsibility ascriptions. The naturalistic meth-
od, however, boils down to studying the first 
field mentioned above, i.e. the psychological 
mechanisms that generate responsibility ascrip-
tions. Thus, the difference between rationalism 
and naturalism is  limited not only to the subject 
of research, but also to the method used.
Paradigmatic examples of rational studies 
of responsibility are carried out by the pro-
ponents of the two main philosophical views 
about the relation of responsibility and de-
terminism: incompatibilism and compatibi-
lism. Incompatibilism is a stance, according 
to which responsibility is not compatible with 
determinism. In other words, the incompatibil-
ists say that the subject cannot be responsible 
for his actions if they were a consequence of 
earlier events and natural laws. The intuition 
of the incompatibilists is well reflected by the 
so-called principle of alternate possibilities, 
according to which a person is responsible for 
his act only if he could have done otherwise, 
and this situation cannot take place in a deter-
ministic world. In recent years, the discussion 
about whether the incompabilitistic stance is 
correct has become particularly strenuous, 
but in the present context, it is interesting to 
note that incompabilitists make an attempt 
to clarify the concept of responsibility, which 
they usually link with the aforementioned prin-
ciple of alternate possibilites.
Compatibilists claim, however, that a person can 
be responsible even in a deterministic world. 
They also argue that determinism not only does 
not undermine responsibility, but that it is re-
quired for the person to be responsible for her 
actions. Compatibilists try to explain the concept 
of responsibility, referring, for example, to having 
the appropriate control over one’s actions. 
Therefore, if a person has adequate control 
over her actions, then she can be responsible 
for these acts. This control is often described 
as the ability to act in accordance with one’s 
desires and beliefs. In other words, as the abil-
ity to act in accordance with one’s reasons.
Interestingly, in the case of the rational meth-
od, despite its focus on conceptual analysis, 
great attention is paid to the consistency of 
these analyses with practices of ascribing 
responsibility. However, most often the con-
ceptual analyses in question are supported by 
thought experiments related to specific actions 
for which responsibility is ascribed; the experi-
ments are supposed to support these analyzes 
or to challenge the position of the opponent.
The basic problem connected with the rational 
method of studying responsibility lies in the fact 
that conceptual intuitions are regarded as the 
main support of these conceptual analyses[2]. 
It is not a fact that philosophers do not real-
ize, and many of them clearly state that an im-
portant argument supporting their views about 
responsibility ascriptions is the intuitiveness of 
these conditions. They are not referring to their 
intuitions or intuitions of other philosophers. 
It is unconvincing to refer to one’s own intui-
tion, if only because everything seems to indi-
cate that the intuitions of philosophers in this 
matter are in conflict. This conflict also leads 
to the conclusion that it cannot be about the 
intuitions of other philosophers. The intuitions 
referred to here are to be held by the majority 
of ordinary people. These intuitions cannot be 
regarded as a conclusive argument, but they 
are certainly considered important. The prob-
lem is, however, that, as it turns out, the empiri-
2Kane, R. (1999) Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on 
Free Will and Indeterminism, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, p. 217.
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cal studies of folk intuitions regarding the con-
ditions responsibility ascriptions indicate that 
these intuitions do not support the two main, 
philosophical solutions to this problem, namely 
compatibilism and incompatibilism.
In the context of naturalistic studies on respon-
sibility, David Hume’s investigations are a good 
example. Despite the fact that he is sometimes 
regarded as a classical compatibilist who claims 
that responsibility is compatible with determin-
ism, the nature of psychological mechanisms 
underpinning responsibility ascriptions is the 
most important in his conception[3]. Namely, 
Hume notices that in the case of responsibility 
ascriptions, emotions are crucial, namely the 
approval or disapproval of a given act, and it 
is these emotions that are the starting point in 
his inquiry. 
He also believes that the mechanism generat-
ing these emotions is so universal and stable 
that it can be described analogously to phe-
nomena related to motion, optical phenomena 
or any other natural phenomena[4]. Describing 
this mechanism in more detail, the author of 
Treatise on Human Understanding states, for 
example, that the emotions underlying the 
practice of responsibility ascriptions are clearly 
retributive, that is, they are directed to the past, 
and not to the future to prevent similar acts. 
Furthermore, this mechanism is simply a natu-
ral disposition of the person and - although it is 
not clear to what extent it is modifiable - it can-
not be modified to a greater extent by philo-
sophical arguments[5].
3Russell, P. (1995) Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Hume’s Way 
of Naturalizing Responsibility, Oxford, p. 67.
4Ibidem, p. 5.
5Hume, D. (2005) Traktat o naturze ludzkiej, tran. Cz. 
Therefore, the Scottish philosopher comes 
to the conclusion, using an ‘experimental 
method of reasoning with a moral subject’ 
instead of a typical conceptual analysis, that 
conceptual analyses of responsibility cannot 
have a greater impact on the practices as-
sociated with its ascription[6]. Therefore, even 
if a certain philosopher took a compatibilist 
position, thus limiting incompatibilist postu-
lates pertaining to responsibility pertaining to 
determinism, he cannot dispose of emotional 
reactions towards acts committed in certain 
circumstances; these reactions are innate to 
all normal members of society. This is despite 
the fact that these emotions would not be jus-
tified if - following incompatibilists, it persons 
cannot be responsible for their actions in a 
deterministic world.
2.1.  Responsibility and the rational 
method of inquiry
As already mentioned, research on responsibil-
ity with the use of rational method most often 
boils down to inquiries pertaining to relations 
between the concept of responsibility and the 
concepts of determinism or free will. There ex-
ists, however, a current within these studies that 
resigns from the metaphysical justification of re-
sponsibility, focusing on conditions that must be 
met by the psychological process underpinning 
the act, so that responsibility ascription is justi-
fied. Therefore, despite the fact that the object 
of interest of philosophers within this current is a 
certain aspect of the human mind’s, similarly to 
Hume, they do not conduct empirical research. 
Instead they try to indicate the aforementioned 
Znamierowski, Warszawa, p. 296.
6Ibidem, p. 546.
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conditions through conceptual analyzes and 
various thought experiments.
Often these experiments are based on the 
scheme proposed by Harry Frankfurt[7]. An exam-
ple of such a thought experiment is as follows:
Kazimierz J. decides to murder his political 
opponent, Bogusław C., with whom he clearly 
loses in polls carried out before the elections 
to the Senate. Kazimierz J. is the second can-
didate for a senator in terms of popularity in 
his district, and he realizes that by getting rid 
of his rival, he will secure himself a win in the 
elections. Kazimierz J. speaks about his plan 
to his good friend, Maksymilian T., who is an 
outstanding neurosurgeon. Maksymilian C. ful-
ly supports his friend’s plan because he feels 
exceptional antipathy toward Bogusław C. He 
supports this plan to the extent that he places 
an implant in the brain of Kazimierz J. which 
monitors the processes taking place therein. 
If Kazimierz J. decided to refrain from imple-
menting his plan, this implant would ‘force’ him 
to murder Bogusław C. However, Kazimierz J. 
stays calm and kills his political opponent.
The above example is obviously unrealistic, but it 
7Frankfurt, H. (2007) Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility, in: Watson, G. (ed.), Free Will, Oxford, issued 2, 
p. 167–176.
allows to indicate intuitions related to the type of 
control of action that justifies the ascription of re-
sponsibility. It seems that Kazimierz J. can be con-
sidered responsible for the murder of Bogusław 
C., despite the fact that he did not have the ability 
to do otherwise, that is, the absolute control over 
his actions. If he made the decision not to carry 
out his plan, then the implant would ‘force’ him to 
do it. This suggests that what is truly important in 
order to ascribe responsibility, is the nature of the 
actual psychological mechanism leading to the 
action. Due to the fact that in the discussed case, 
the decision-making process of Kazimierz J. was 
not manipulated and he behaved in accordance 
with his beliefs and desires, that is according to 
his reasons, the intuitions pertaining to respon-
sibility suggest that he is responsible for his act. 
The type of control Kazimierz J. possess, guid-
ance control, has been thoroughly analyzed by 
John Fischer and Mark Ravizza[8]. They indicated 
that the person has guidance control over his ac-
tions when her actual decision-making mecha-
nism, which operated in a particular situation, is 
reason-responsive.
Reason-responsiveness can be weak or 
strong[9]. 
8Fischer, J., Ravizza, M. (1998) Responsibility and Control. A 
Theory of Moral Responsibility, Oxford.
9Ibidem, p. 42.
In conclusion, this kind of research on responsibility, ased 
onthe rational method, indicates that the intuitions associ-
ated with responsibility ascriptions are strongly related to 
the actual sequence of events that resulted in the action. 
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The strong reason-responsiveness is the capaci-
ty to act in accordance with a sufficient reason for 
action in every case the person has this reason. 
For example, if the decision-making mechanism 
of Kazimierz J. was strongly reason-responsive, 
in view of the fact that he has a sufficient reason 
to murder Bogusław C., namely that it will enable 
him to win the election , a course of events in 
which he does not kill his rival is impossible. On 
the other hand, weak reason-responsiveness is 
the capacity to act in accordance with a suffi-
cient reason for action in some possible scenar-
io. The decision-making mechanism of Kazimierz 
J. would be weakly reason-responsive if would 
be possible for him to act on the sufficient reason 
to murder Bogusław C.
Strong reason-responsiveness is too strong 
a condition for responsibility ascription. One 
can imagine a case in which a person commits 
theft, despite the fact that she has sufficient 
reason to refrain from this act, such as the con-
viction that he will be caught. Despite this, if 
in the current sequence of events leading to 
the decision to commit theft something that 
would undermine his guidance control would 
not occur, then we can certainly ascribed her 
responsibility. In order for her to be considered 
responsible, it is enough that she has  weak 
reason-responsiveness. This ability does not 
guarantee that she will always act in accord-
ance with a sufficient reason for action, but it 
guarantees that there is a scenario in which 
she will act in accordance with this reason. So, 
if she would find out that if she were to commit 
theft, she would surely be caught by the police, 
then she would not commit this crime in some 
possible course of events. Knowledge that if 
she commits the crime, she will certainly be 
caught, is a sufficient reason for action.
On the other hand, if there is no course of events 
when the person can act on a sufficient reason, 
then this person has no guidance control and 
cannot be responsible. For example, the actual 
decision-making mechanism of Kazimierz J. is 
weakly reason-responsive, because if he was 
convinced that his crime would be detected, 
then a course of events is possible in which he 
does not commit the murder. It could occur if the 
an implant was not placed inside his brain.
In conclusion, this kind of research on respon-
sibility, ased onthe rational method, indicates 
that the intuitions associated with responsibil-
ity ascriptions are strongly related to the actual 
sequence of events that resulted in the action. If 
there is nothing in this sequence that would un-
dermine the subject’s decision-making capacity, 
responsibility ascription is justified to the subject. 
In particular, according to this view, absolute 
control is not required to ascribe responsibility.
2.2.  Responsibility and the naturalistic 
method of inquiry
The above inquiries pertain to conceptual intui-
tions about conditions of responsibility ascrip-
tion. It seems that the reconstruction of the folk 
image of responsibility requires also empirical 
investigations of these intuitions. As already 
mentioned, the philosophical intuitions related 
to responsibility are not particularly represent-
ative, if only because of the numerous incon-
sistencies between them.
Interestingly, empirical research on folk intui-
tions about responsibility suggest at least two 
very different hypotheses of how we intuitively 
think about responsibility. What is more, these 
hypotheses correspond to the aforementioned 
distinction between absolute and regulative con-
trol. Joshua Knobe formulated the first of these 
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hypotheses and named it the transcendence 
vision[10]. This hypothesis assumes that accord-
ing to the folk intuitions, the person is outside the 
normal causal order, so she is not determined 
by external causes in the environment and by 
internal (e.g. psychological) causes. In other 
words, the person has absolute control over 
her actions. Supporting his hypothesis, Knobe 
pointed to the results of several empirical stud-
ies, two of which seem particularly interesting.
In the first experiment, conducted by Shaun 
Nichols and Joshua Knobe, the subjects were 
divided into two groups[11]. Members of each of 
them were then presented with one scenario, 
with the scenario in one group being abstract 
and specific in the other one. Both, however, 
took place in universe A, which is determinis-
tic. The first group was then asked whether in 
universe A, it was possible for someone to be 
responsible for his actions (abstract scenario). 
The second group was asked whether a particu-
lar person had been responsible for a particular 
act, which was described in detail in the sce-
nario presented to them. The results of this ex-
periment were surprising: 72% of respondents 
presented with the concrete scenario stated 
that the protagonist of the scenario was respon-
sible for his action, and in an abstract situation, 
86% of respondents stated that responsibility 
in the deterministic world was impossible. This 
test indicates, at least prima facie, an inconsist-
ency in folk intuitions regarding the conditions 
of responsibility ascriptions. This inconsistency 
10Knobe, J. (2014) Free Will and Scientific Vision, in: Machery, E. 
(ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, New 
York, p. 69–85.
11Nichols, S., Knobe, J. (2008) Moral Responsibility and 
Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions, in: 
Knobe, J. , Nichols, S. (eds.) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford, 
p. 105–128.
is one of the arguments against basing philo-
sophical conceptions of responsibility on folk 
intuitions. Knobe explains this result referring 
to the transcendence vision: the intuition about 
the lack of responsibility in the abstract scenario 
results from the belief that in such a world, a 
person cannot influence her own actions. In the 
concrete scenario, there is no specific cause 
that would undermine the influence of the pro-
tagonist of the scenario on his act.
The second experiment, conducted by Eddy 
Nahmias and Dylan Murray, pertained to the 
folk understanding of internal causation - that 
is, the causality of beliefs or desires -  and its 
influence on the ascription of responsibility[12]. 
In this study, the participants were informed 
that everything in universe A happened ac-
cording to deterministic laws. However, they 
were then asked whether they agreed or disa-
greed with the following statements: (1) in uni-
verse A, what a person believes does not affect 
her actions; (2) in universe A, what a person 
desires does not affect her actions. 
Most of the respondents agreed with these state-
ments. This suggests that they understood inter-
nal causality as being beyond the ordinary causal 
order, because determinism undermines it.  
This result is also surprising because in mod-
ern philosophy, the dominant view of the folk 
understanding of mental states’ influence is 
that this influence is causal. If this were the 
case, however, then in the above experiment, 
the participants should have responded that 
in the deterministic world, beliefs and desires 
influence the actions undertaken - precisely 
12Nahmias, E., Murray, D. (2010) Experimental Philosophy on 
Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions, in: 
Aguilar, J. , Buckareff, A., Frankish, K., (eds.), New Waves in 
Philosophy of Action, Hampshire, England, p. 189–216.
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because they are the causes of these actions, 
or they at least to some extent determine 
them. Knobe explains the result of this experi-
ment referring to the vision of transcendence, 
according to which the relation between the 
mental states of a person and his actions is not 
causal, but  rational. In other words, the ex-
planation of actions referring to mental states 
is based on reasons and reasons are not or-
dinary causes. As Knobe points out, it is dif-
ficult to provide an uncontroversial description 
of the explanation based on reasons, but one 
can agree with the claim that this explanation 
assumes that a person can choose actions on 
the basis of his reasons, regardless of the fact 
that she is affected by ‘ordinary’ causes.
On the other hand, according to another hy-
pothesis proposed by Nahmias and Thompson, 
named ‘causal competition principle’, responsi-
bility will usually be ascribed when person’s rea-
sons influence her reasons[13]. In other words, if 
conscious deliberation cannot influence the 
decision to act, then, usually, responsibility will 
not be ascribed. This claim to some extent cor-
responds to the above explanation of the results 
of the experiment regarding the folk under-
standing of the influence of beliefs and desires 
on the acts given by Knobe. He argued that in 
the context of folk understanding of the condi-
tions of responsibility ascription, what is impor-
tant is whether the reasons are not deprived of 
the possibility to influence action. In contrast 
to Knobe, Nahmias and Thompson argue, 
however, that the understanding of persons as 
transcendental in relation to ordinary causal or-
der does not belong to the folk intuitions about 
responsibility. According to the causal com-
13Nahmias, E., Thompson, M. (2014) A Naturalistic Vision of Free 
Will, in: Machery, E. (ed.), Current Controversies in Experimental 
Philosophy, New York, p. 97.
petition principle the folk understanding of re-
sponsibility is closely related to the concept of 
guidance control.
The causal competition principle is supported 
by the results of another experiment in which 
two scenarios are presented to participants[14]. 
According to the first scenario, in the future, 
scientists will be able to predict every decision 
with 100% accuracy by means of a scanner 
investigating the brain activity of the person 
making the decision.The protagonist of this 
scenario, Jill, agrees to wear the scanner for 
a month as a participant in the scientific ex-
periment (is the scanner is built in into a light 
hat). On the day of the governor and presiden-
tial election, during which she is carrying the 
scanner, Jill wonders which candidate to vote 
for. Researchers monitoring Jill’s brain activity 
make a prediction about her choice and, as it 
turns out, their predictions completely coincide 
with her actual decision. 90% of the respond-
ents who were presented with this scenario 
considered that Jill was responsible for how 
she voted. The second scenario presented 
to the participants also included information 
about the possibility of an accurate prediction 
of decisions based on the observation of brain 
activity. However, in this version, the research-
ers are also able to influence Jill’s decision with 
her being unaware about this. What is more, 
they influence her decision about the vote. In 
this scenario, 72% of participants responded 
that Jill is not responsible for her decision. 
Nahmias and Thompson claim that the ability to 
predict decisions based on brain activity is not a 
reason to undermine responsibility, what is par-
ticularly important, that people do not recognize 
the mind or the self as something that is beyond 
14Ibidem, p. 91–95.
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the ordinary causal order. The respondents’ an-
swers in the first scenario indicate that even if 
such a prediction is made, the person still has 
the opportunity to influence her own behavior by 
consciously considering the alternatives avail-
able and then selecting one of them. This hap-
pens even when the processes occurring in the 
brain cause decisions. This conclusion is also 
supported by responses given by participants 
presented with the second scenario, in which 
Jill’s choice was manipulated by scientists. In 
this situation, she is unable to influence her be-
havior through conscious deliberation and par-
ticipants do not ascribe her responsibility.
Nahmias and Thompson suggest that ‘ people 
will be reluctant to hold an agent responsible 
for behavior when they interpret her behavior 
as being fully caused by factors that do not in-
clude any of her reasons (or by processes that 
do not include any of her reasoning)’[15].
It seems that the causal competition principle - re-
lated to the concept of guidance control - explains 
the results of the above discussed experiments 
better than the transcendence vision which is re-
lated to the concept of absolute control. In par-
ticular, the results of Nahmias and Thompson’s 
experiment seem to indicate that even when 
the mental states of the subject are completely 
determined by earlier causes, the subjects are 
still inclined to recognize that mental states play 
a causal role in producing action. On the other 
hand, responsibility is not ascribed when the ac-
tual decision-making mechanism was not able to 
react adequately to reasons, as in the case  when 
scientists influenced Jill’s decision. The lack of 
threat toward responsibility from determinism is 
particularly clear in concrete situations, in which 
a description of the psychological process leading 
15Ibidem, p. 97.
to the action is given, according to which persons 
decision-making mechanism is intact. In abstract 
situations, determinism undermines the causal in-
fluence of mental states on behavior because the 
respondents recognize that it is past events and 
laws of nature which lead to the action and not 
mental states of the person. Therefore, the ten-
dency of the respondents not to ascribe respon-
sibility in abstract contexts can be explained in a 
more simple manner than by introducing the as-
sumption of exclusion from the causal order. 
3.  Responsibility from the scientific 
perspective
The above considerations indicate that it is 
not determinism which threatens responsi-
bility. The threat pertains to the nature of the 
psychological mechanism leading to action. If 
this mechanism is not appropriate, it will not 
allow to justify responsibility ascriptions. A 
mechanism that would not justify responsibil-
ity ascription would have to be of the kind that 
would, inter alia, preclude conscious delibera-
tion to influence action. The scientific image of 
the world in which there would be no place for 
responsibility, could be built by psychology or 
neuroscience. Within these sciences,  expla-
nation consists precisely in pointing out the 
mechanisms responsible for the occurrence 
of the phenomena being explained[16]. Accord-
ing to the mechanistic view of the mind and 
brain, mental and neuronal phenomena can be 
explained by indicating the components of the 
mechanisms which produce them as well as 
their organization and interaction.
16Craver, C. (2007) Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and 
the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Oxford, p. 2–9; Bechtel, 
W., Wright, C. (2007) What is Psychological Explanation?, in: 
Symons, J., Calvo, P. (eds.), The Routledge Companion to 
Philosophy of Psychology, New York, p. 119.
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In recent decades, there have been many pro-
posals of mechanistic explanations of the op-
eration of the human mind and brain which have 
severely limited and even ruled out the influence 
of conscious deliberation on action. The first 
prominent hypothesis in this context was pro-
posed by Benjamin Libet and his colleagues[17]. 
The results of these studies have revealed that 
brain activity - measured with the help of an 
electroencephalograph - leading to the move-
ment of a finger precedes the moment when 
the person becomes aware about her decision 
to move her finger. This was interpreted by the 
researchers as undermining the assumption of 
conscious control over action, which is  limited 
only to the possibility of inhibiting the action.
Libet’s paradigm was used several years ago 
in the experiment in which functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) was used. This is a 
much more advanced device for measuring 
brain activity in comparison to the electroen-
cephalograph. Chun Sion Soon and his col-
leagues asked their subjects to press the but-
ton with their left or right index finger ‘when 
they felt the urge to do so’ and to pay particu-
lar attention to when the conscious decision 
17Libet, B., Gleason, C., Wright, E., Pearl, D. (1982) Time of 
Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral 
Activity (ReadinessPotential). The Unconscious Initiation of a 
Freely Voluntary Act, Brain, vol. 106, p. 623–642.
about the movement was made[18]. Participants 
were aware of their decision about half a sec-
ond before pressing the button. The results of 
the fMRI study indicated, however, that the ac-
tivity in the frontopolar cortex, on the basis of 
which it was possible to predict which button 
will be pressed, started 7 to 10 seconds before 
the movement was made. In addition, activity 
in the additional motor cortex, on the basis of 
which it was possible to predict when the but-
ton will be pressed, occurred about 5 seconds 
before the movement was performed. The ac-
curacy of these predictions was 60%. These 
results seem to limit the impact of conscious 
deliberation on action.
A similar proposal suggesting such epi-
phenomenalism was proposed by Daniel 
Wegner[19]. The starting point of Wegner’s con-
siderations is the intuition that our actions are 
often the result of a conscious choice. How-
ever, according to the American psychologist, 
this intuition is based on illusion. In order to 
support this thesis, he accepts, just like Libet, 
a temporal view on conscious choice. Based 
on the analysis of the results of many psy-
chological and neurocognitive experiments, 
he states that the processes taking place in 
18Soon, C., Brass, M., Heinze, H., Haynes, J. (2008) Unconscious 
Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, Nature 
Neuroscience, vol. 11, p. 543–545. 
19Wegner, D. (2002) The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, Mass. 
It seems, therefore, that the scientific evidence pertaining 
to the nature of action control underpinning responsibility 
does not preclude the influence of conscious deliberation 
on action, but to some extent limits it. 
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the brain, as well as unconscious psychologi-
cal processes, not only precede the moment 
of realizing decisions about action, but also 
constitute the cause of the action. Wegner 
concludes that: ‘Usually, we think we want to 
do our voluntary actions consciously, but this 
is an illusion. (...) Conscious will arises from 
processes that are psychological and anatomi-
cally distinct from the processes by which the 
mind creates action’[20].
However, in the context of the conditions of re-
sponsibility ascription, which is guidance control, 
these empirical studies do not seem very prob-
lematic. The person has guidance control over 
her action when the actual mechanism leading 
to the action is weakly reason-responsive. In the 
case of Libet’s experiment, the movement was so 
simple that it is problematic whether the partici-
pants made any conscious deliberation. Wegner 
also understands his hypothesis about the illusion 
of conscious will universally, in relation to every 
action, despite the fact that the research he dis-
cusses primarily concerns simple or ‘non-stand-
ard’ activities, such as those that are the result of 
hypnosis, automatisms or the so-called alien hand 
syndrome. In the case of the latter, the mechanism 
leading to action, does not seem to be reason-
responsive, but it only means that Wegner’s thesis 
applies to such special circumstances.
It seems, therefore, that the scientific evidence 
pertaining to the nature of action control under-
pinning responsibility does not preclude the influ-
ence of conscious deliberation on action, but to 
some extent limits it. This is in line with one of in-
teresting scientific conceptions about the human 
mind, according to which it consists of two cogni-
tive systems or two types of cognitive processes. 
It is proposed within many areas of psychology 
20Ibidem, p. 29.
(and neuropsychology)and it is claimed to explain 
such cognitive competences as, for instance, 
reading[21], formation of moral judgments[22], 
making decisions in conditions of  uncertainty[23], 
reasoning[24], induction[25] or choice[26]. The basic 
idea of this conception is that individual cognitive 
competences of a person are implemented  by 
two types of cognitive processes that differ from 
one another in the way they process information. 
The cognitive processes that make up system 1 
are automatic, usually unconscious, association-
based and non-complex. Due to the fact that 
these are non-complex processes, they are often 
referred to as heuristics. In contrast to system 1, 
system 2 consists of conscious, intentional and 
complex processes. System 1 plays a dominant 
role in thought and action, although in some situ-
ations system 2 may undermine the ‘decision’ of 
system 1.
The two systems account of the mind is well 
illustrated by the theory of moral judgment 
21Coltheart, M. et al. (1993) Models of Reading Aloud: Dual 
Route and Parallel‑Distributed – Processing Approaches, 
Psychological Review, vol. 100, p. 589–608.
22Haidt, J. (2001) The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A 
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, Psychological 
Review, vol. 108, p. 814–834.
23Gigerenzer, G., Goldstein, D. (1996) Reasoning the Fast and 
Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, Psychological 
Review, vol. 103, p. 650–669; Kahneman, D., Frederick, S. 
(2002) Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution 
in Intuitive Judgment, in: Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., Kahneman, 
D. (eds.), Heuristics & Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment, New York, p. 49–81.
24Evans, J. , Over, D. (1996), Rationality and Reasoning, Hove;
Stanovich, K. (1999), Who is Rational? Studies of Individual 
Differences in Reasoning, New York.
25Sloman, S. (1996) The Empirical Case For Two Systems of
Reasoning, Psychological Bulletin, vol. 119, p. 3–22.
26Wilson, T. (2002) Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the 
Adaptive Unconscious, Cambridge, Mass. 
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proposed by Jonathan Haidt[27]. According to 
this theory, the dominant causal role in issu-
ing such judgments intuition, which is shaped 
almost exclusively by emotional and social 
factors. All subsequent attempts to justify 
moral judgments are usually only attempts to 
rationalize earlier emotional reactions. Cogni-
tive processes responsible for creating moral 
intuitions belong to system 1. This does not 
mean that conscious deliberation does not af-
fect these judgments, but cognitive processes 
belonging to system 2, which are at the basis 
of these phenomena, play only a marginal role.
According to the two-system theory, the per-
son is not deprived of the possibility of in-
fluencing her decisions through conscious 
deliberation. This theory does not preclude 
justification of responsibility ascriptions. It 
seems, however, that at least to some ex-
tent this understanding of the human mind, 
is problematic in the context of ascribing re-
sponsibility. For example, the moral judgment 
and action caused by it, underpinned by the 
automatic, unconscious, and non-complex 
associative mechanism seems unable to  ap-
27J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog…
propriately respond to reasons.  It is not evi-
dent whether there are scenarios possible in 
which this type of mechanism will appropri-
ately respond to sufficient reasons.
4. Summary
In this article two perspectives of inquiry per-
taining to responsibility were discussed: philo-
sophical and scientific. Philosophical research 
pertaining to responsibility has been divided 
into the research based on the rational method, 
which consist in the analysis of the concept of 
responsibility and other concepts in its direct 
vicinity, and the research based on naturalistic 
method, which takes into account the empiri-
cal findings pertaining to folk intuitions about 
responsibility. It was argued, however, that 
despite the methodological differences, the 
results of the research conducted with these 
methods boil down to the same condition of 
responsibility ascription, i.e., guidance control. 
Next, the empirical evidence pertaining to re-
sponsibility was analyzed . It was claimed that 
while the scientific image of the mind does not 
undermine the possibility of guidance control, , 
it may in some cases limit it.
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